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Responses to accidents in different industrial sectors 
Preben H. Lindøe, Ole A. Engen, Odd Einar Olsen 
A  b  s  t  r  a  c  t 
Accidents produce external pressures on companies leading to new regulations and renegotiation of 
enforcement of regulations. Our perspective is institutional with a focus on the extended dialogue among 
regulators and the industry. The empirical focus is offshore oil and gas production, deep sea and coastal 
ﬁsheries, and maritime transportation with a segment of older bulk carriers. The ﬁndings are that 
structural characteristics of both the industries and the regulatory regime determine the interactions 
between the regulated and the regulator. The paper illustrates that in industrial sectors where hazards 
and risks are visible and of public interest, it is easier to implement regulations through outside pressure 
from regulators and other stakeholders such as internationally organised unions. 
Keywords: 
Accidents 
Regulators 
Risk regulations 
External stakeholders 
1. Introduction 
The development of risk regulation and risk management is a consequence of a modernisation process whereby social production of
wealth has been systematically accompanied by technical, medical and social risk (Beck, 1986; Bernstein, 1996). In the 1970s and 
1980s, major disasters revealed high hazard levels in certain industries: chemical production (Seveso in 1976; Bophal in 1984), 
nuclear power (Chernobyl in 1986), offshore petroleum (Alexander Kielland in 1980; Piper Alpha in 1988) and maritime transport 
(Herald of Free Enterprise in 1987; Exxon Valdez in 1989). Such major accidents mobilized public opinion and increased debates 
about safety as well as self-reﬂection within the industries. During the following decades, new organising principles and methods of 
assessing, managing and regulating risk were developed (Power, 2004). In the effort to bridge the gap from incalculable uncertainty to 
calculable risk, there is a need to deﬁne and model risk and organisational means to improve safety (Power, 2007). In this endeavor 
many actors are taking part: companies and unions, politicians who frame economic and social regulation and allocate resources, 
scientiﬁc communities, stakeholders within civil society, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), scientiﬁc communities, and so on 
(Renn, 2008). 
Instrumental models of regulation have lost their dominating position in the search for better regulation and safety management 
systems. Furthermore, new concepts of regulation and safety management, where part of the regulatory process is delegated from the 
authorities to industrial stakeholders, have been developed (Frick, 2000). New concepts have been coined and are widely used, such as 
‘enforced self-regulation’, ‘regulated self-regulation’, ‘meta-regulation’ and ‘internal control’ (Ayres and Braithwate, 1992). Within these 
frameworks of self-regulation, the enterprise is obliged to identify and assess risks and hazards embedded in its operations (Hopkins 
and Hale, 2002). 
Consequently, there is a need to develop frameworks of problem solving whereby information from incidents is channelled back 
to the enterprise through efﬁcient feedback loops. Thus, institutional and organizational designs which promote improvement among the 
actors will remain central in developing proactive management systems. However, barriers to improvement and learning are numerous, 
some of them rooted in a lack of mechanism for handling information from ‘weak signals’ and ‘early warnings’ 
regarding incidents  (Pidgeon  and  O´ Leary,  2000).  Accordingly, it should be assessed how the stakeholders may use and assess the 
incidents and accidents and overcome hindrances to improved actions. Further relevant arenas should be identiﬁed in which the 
companies may work together with regulators and external stake- holders in enforcement for risk reduction. 
The paper examines three maritime-based industries with high numbers of fatal accidents and how enforcement actions 
introduced by regulators and pressure from external stakeholders contribute to improve safety and reduce risk. The empirical focus 
emerges from three historical case studies of offshore oil and gas production, deep sea and coastal ﬁsheries, and maritime 
transportation involving bulk older carriers. 
 
2. Analytical framework 
 
Managing and controlling risk takes place at different system levels, ranging from the  authorities  that  make  the  regulatory 
framework to the operators at the sharp end of the workplaces, as presented by Rasmussen (1997; Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000), 
Leveson (2004) and Renn (2008). Rasmussen (1997) presents the ‘regulator’ and the ‘regulated’ as the main groups of actors. The ﬁrst one 
includes government and regulators/associations and the second management, staff and the workplace. Leveson (2004) developed a 
sophisticated System-Theoretic Accident Modeling and Process (STAMP) model with multiple levels such as congress and 
legislatures, government regulatory agencies, industry associations, user associations, unions, insurance companies and courts, and 
companies that operate in a dynamic relationship between ‘system development’ and ‘system operations’. 
The analytical framework presented below also uses a system-theoretic perspective with a pattern of interrelated actors at different 
organizational levels. In Fig. 1 the industries are grouped as local, national and international enterprises. The regulatory bodies can be 
national agencies as well as regional (European Union, EU) or global (United Nations, UN; International Labour Organization, ILO). 
The model should be read from the ‘sharp end’ with publicly visible incidents or fatal accidents at the left side towards the 
industrial responses at the right side, indicating actions that have been undertaken as a result of external pressure. The industry makes 
up a complex pattern of interlinked actors with customers, vendors and suppliers, insurance companies, and so on. On a micro level 
the individual enterprise consists of individuals, organisational units, technical installations, along with plants, vessels, equipment, 
and so on. That is consistent with a socio-technical or ‘man technology organisation’ (MTO) perspective indicating interplay of 
technical/physical artefacts and social elements (Olsen and Lindøe, 2009). From this perspective workplaces are seen as communities 
of practice containing actors with both individual and collective mindsets (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000; Weick et al., 1999). 
Furthermore, institutions and organisations are seen as learning entities in which safety culture plays an important role (Parker et 
al., 2006). On a national and global level the actors can be corporations, associations, global chains of suppliers and contractors, 
investors and shareholders, national and international unions and federations, and so on. Managing risk in the industry follows a 
hierarchical pattern with higher-level safety management systems (Frick, 2000) supplemented by using the relevant international and 
national codes and standards and procedures and routines of ‘best practise’ within the industry (Brunsson and Jacobsson, 2000). 
Regulators enforce mechanisms of control and sanctions towards the industrial actors, based on their legitimate role in society 
and among the regulated bodies (Baldwin and Cave, 1999). Their role can be characterized as compensating for market failure in 
handling risk, informing public opinion by inﬂuencing political priorities and decisions, and inﬂuencing stakeholders and their power 
structure (Hood et al., 2001). On the other hand, decisions on risk management in the industries are based on responses towards 
regulatory agencies and organisational capacity (competence and resources). The model implies that the relationship between 
power and trust among the regulating agencies and industrial actors inﬂuences the pattern of interaction. This means that the 
regulating agencies possess the abilities to exercise sanctions and that the industrial actors accept use of such sanctions if they do not 
behave in accordance with the rules of the game. A relevant example may be the petroleum concession system. The oil companies 
accept the governmental right of distributing con- cessions. They also know that if they behave inappropriately, for example if they 
break safety regulations, they risk being excluded from forthcoming concession rounds. On the one hand the companies accept the 
governmental power in handling concessions and on the other they trust that the system will be fair and reasonable if they behave 
within accepted norms. 
The regulations are worked out globally, as treaties and conventions, as well as regionally (for example, by the EU) and nationally, and 
the process is inﬂuenced by public opinion conveyed via media coverage and strong external stakeholders. Such stakeholders may be, for 
example, NGOs, consumers’ associations or environmental activists who may enact their inﬂuential role by using information 
technology and mass media. An example of this dynamic was seen in 1995, when the British government announced its support for 
Shell’s application to dispose of the Brent Spar oil storage platform in deep Atlantic waters. Greenpeace organized a worldwide, high- 
proﬁle media campaign against the plan. The platform was given temporary moorings in a Norwegian fjord until Shell, under intense 
media pressure, in January 1998 announced its decision to re-use the steel structure in the construction of new harbour facilities 
(Jordan, 2001). 
Given this context, we pose as our research question: What factors are inﬂuencing the responses of the companies and industries after 
severe incidents and fatal accidents? 
 
 
 
Fig  1   Analytical framework  
3. Method
The empirical basis for the three industry case studies rests on multiple sources of data. The Norwegian oil and gas industry has been
followed by Norwegian research institutions during the last 35 years, with a portfolio of projects related to technological change, safety 
management and regulation (Olsen and Lindøe, 2009). Hazards and safety management issues regarding the ﬁshing ﬂeet were assessed in 
a national survey (Lie et al., 2005) and speciﬁc issues from case studies on ﬁshing vessels were examined (Aasjord et al., 2005). Finally, 
the data regarding maritime bulk carriers were collected through secondary sources (Veritas, 1997) and a speciﬁc case study (Lindøe and 
Karlsen, 2008). By using three critical samples as ‘cases’, it should be possible to identify some main generic features providing valid 
knowledge about the industries’ responses to incidents and accidents (Yin, 2003). Even though the three industries are different, they share 
some similar characteristics which make them interesting to compare. All three are subject to regulatory frameworks that aim to reduce 
the likelihood of critical incidents. 
4. Findings from the cases
The guiding perspective in the analytical model is a focus on the legitimacy of the regulator and the capability of the industry. By using
major accidents as the most robust indicator, the hazards in each industry are presented. Then a broader picture of the regulatory 
regime, the industries and external stakeholders is presented. 
4.1. Petroleum industry 
The ﬁrst drilling operation in the North Sea started in the mid 1960s with technologies being used by US oil companies in the 
Mexican Gulf under the legislation of the ﬁrst Petroleum Acts in Norway (1963) and the UK (1964). Major accidents followed in the 
ﬁrst decades. In the UK, the sinking of the Sea Gem jack-up rig in 1965 received considerable  public  attention,  both  due  to the ‘cost’ 
(loss of 13 lives) and the ‘beneﬁt’ of discovering the ﬁrst commercial offshore gas ﬁeld. The inquiry and discussion that followed led to the 
introduction of the Mineral Working (Offshore Installation) Act, leading to the ‘juridiﬁcation’ of the relationship between employers 
and employees in the industry (Paterson, 2007, p. 48). In the Norwegian sector, the blow-out on the Bravo platform and the Alexandre 
Kielland disaster, with a loss of 123 lives, were eye-openers for the industry, the regulators and the public. There has not been a major 
accident on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS) since that catastrophe but the gas leakage on the Snorre A platform in 2004 was a 
reminder of the potential risk of such major accidents (Schieﬂoe and Vikland, 2006). 
From a level of almost 50 in 1976, the number of injuries per million working hours has a deﬁnite downward sloping trend and ends at 
about 10 in 2006. However, the indicator says nothing about severity since almost 80% of the incidents are minor injuries such as 
broken ﬁngers and twisted ankles, and the differences between operators and contractors and between permanent and mobile 
installations should also be taken into account. Yet there is no doubt that a decline in fatal injuries has taken place (Tjelmeland, 2005). 
Gas leakage is another major risk factor on platforms. From a high level of 45 severe gas leakages above 10 kg s-1 in 2000, the 
number has been reduced to below 10 in 2008. In conclusion, it is fair to state that some of the main risk indicators from the off- 
shore sector indicate a trend of continuous improvement from the beginning in the 1970s up to now, even if some of the ofﬁcial data 
can be disputed (Ryggvik, 2000). 

4.3. Bulk carriers 
Accidents with environmental consequences such as Exxon Valdez, or within maritime public transport such as the Herald of Free 
Enterprise, get high media coverage and public and political attention, while other major losses in the maritime sectors are often 
neglected. According to Bailey (2006) the mortality rate among UK seafarers is 26 times higher than the national average onshore. 
The substantial losses of standard bulk carriers between 1980 and 1996 is one example of fatal accidents happening without 
media or public coverage. In that period 55 ships were lost, 40 ships were seriously damaged and 611 seamen’s lives were lost. All 
these casualties were due to structural losses (e.g. low technical standards) and not to collisions, grounding, ﬁres, and so on. The age of 
the ships was the most signiﬁcant factor in causing the calamities, followed by heavy weather and heavy cargo. Other important 
factors that inﬂuence loss rate are corrosion and maintenance (Veritas, 1997). 
The loss of Leros Strength on the southwest coast of Norway shed light on the cases in the statistics. A short version of the case is 
presented in the box below, based on Lindøe and Karlsen (2008) and    http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sclerstr.htm. Leros Strength 
February 8, 1997, the captain requested immediate assistance and few minutes later the ship had sunk with no survivors 
among the 20 person Polish crew. Oil from the ship polluted shores nearby. Insufﬁcient legislation about responsibilities and 
compensation among the stakeholders was revealed in court cases that followed. Leros Strength was built in Japan in 1976 and 
in 1993 it was sold to Lambda Sea Shipping of Cyprus, time-chartered to a German company in 1994. In 1996 defects on lifesaving 
appliances, cargo doors and hatch covers were discovered and it was then approved by the Italian classiﬁcation society, Registro 
Italiano Navale. The accident attained wide media coverage both in Norway and in Poland and the case brought new attention to ship 
accidents where Polish interests were involved. The Nordic Federation of Transport Workers demanded an extensive scrutiny 
of the accident, and the Norwegian Government granted money for diving operations to inspect the wreck. The Norwegian 
Maritime Directorate (Directorate, 2000) issued a report on the sinking, picturing a vessel, not seaworthy and suffering from more 
than two decades of decay. 
The only time the ship owners approached the widows of the lost crew of the Leros Strength was immediately after the sinking 
to persuade them to accept a low ﬁgure settlement. After the accident, The International Transport Federation (ITF) advised 
the widows and their families on the cause of the sinking and supported them with legal assistance to obtain compensation. The 
compensation was ﬁnally settled at US$30,000 for each dead seafarer, which was actually the same amount the ship owners initially 
offered. In October, 2000, two widows made a statement to an IMO/ILO expert working group, stating that they still, three years 
and nine months after the sinking, had not received any compensation from the ship owners. In the global maritime industry, safety improvements are taken care of by treaties and conventions from the UN’s International 
Maritime Organisation (IMO). The ﬁrst regulation, entitled ‘Safety of Life at Sea’ (SOLAS), was adopted in 1914 as a response to the 
Titanic disaster. Later on, new treaties and codes have been added, such as Standard of Training, Certiﬁcates and Watch-Keeping 
(STCW), various codes on issues of the caretaking of human resources, and the International Convention for the Prevention of 
Pollution from Ships (MARPOL). Major accidents during the late 1980s were seen as being due to human error and the fault of 
management. The capsizing of the ferry, Herald of Free Enterprise, in 1987 (193 lives lost) was instrumental in bringing about an effort 
to achieve better regulation. In 1989, IMO adopted guidelines to ensure safety, prevent human injury or loss of life, and avoid damage 
to the environment, especially the marine environment, and to property. The guidelines were adopted as the International Management 
Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code). In 1988 it became mandatory and therefore part of the 
regulation for the members of IMO. 
The main elements in the regulatory framework regarding health, safety and environment (HSE) issues are shown in Table 2. O
a global level, IMO and ILO are responsible for developing and reviewing treaties and binding agreements among the member states
Safety management systems (ISM Code) have to be adopted on a national level and implemented across the whole maritim
industry. n 
. 
e 

and capable operators. By developing the framework of enforced self-regulation, the NPD managed to motivate and force the industry into 
internal processes of improving safety standards. The close connection between the industry operators and their contractors and suppliers 
made communications with the NPD easy.  The NPD could use licences and contracts as ‘the stick and the carrot’ for this process. In the 
end, the industry accepted the new principles of enforced self-regulation and the potential of a ‘three-pillared’ system of cooperation 
between company, union and authorities (Karlsen and Lindøe, 2006; Olsen and Lindøe, 2009). 
The industry has the advantage of being able to act with the NPD and PSA as one strong and coordinating regulator. The degree of 
cooperation varies between the actors from time to time, and presently there exist different means of cooperation. After 2000, a period 
of distrust among the parties led to tendencies towards disintegration of the tripartite system and the role of the regulators. An open 
dispute among the authorities and industry on safety levels during the autumn of 2000 was enforced by a fatal accident on the Oseberg 
platform on Christmas Eve 2000. The NPD made a very critical complaint, saying that the accident seemed to be an outcome of a 
management problem and a culture of violating procedures. The victim’s mother made public complaints to the involved stakeholders. 
Moen et al. (2009, p. 6) analyzed this period and stated that ‘The Norwegian authorities took active actions that went far beyond a 
regulatory role. The intervention of the Minister of Local Government and Regional Development signalled that safety in the oil 
industry was considered a political issue’. The initiative was followed by the establishment of the Safety Forum, a new monitoring tool 
(RNNP) and speciﬁc projects of improvement within the framework, ‘Working together for safety’. 
Public awareness of major accidents via the media, in correspondence with politicians, debates and decisions in Parliament, is 
another mechanism of enforcement. The use of the media as a means of putting pressure on authorities has been useful regarding some 
fatal accidents, chemical exposure, diving, and so on. In general, there is an increasing awareness among the public and civil society 
groups regarding the negative effects of the industry, such as air pollution and global warming, polluting the seas, and adverse impacts 
upon the vulnerable Arctic areas (Mikkelsen and Langhelle, 2008). Issues of safe and legitimate operation will probably be strengthened 
in public opinion by media, action groups, and ﬁnally by politicians and legislators. 
However, an important question is whether this compliance with the regulation and political will can be sustained outside the context and 
culture in which it has been developed (Kringen, 2009; Olsen and Lindøe, 2009). This is a challenge for the many newcomers to the 
NCS as well as the major Norwegian operator, StatoilHydro, moving from the NCS to into the global scene. 
5.2. Fisheries 
The issues surrounding ﬁsheries are in stark contrast to the petroleum industry. The combination of a socio-economic framework with 
little incentive for investment, individual ownership, high risk culture, and no external pressure from media or stakeholders, does not 
facilitate and promote improvements. The industrial structure seems to be a hindrance to implementation of systematic safety 
improvements. One important factor is that the restructuring of ﬁsheries and reallocation of ﬁshing quotas has reduced proﬁtability for many 
coastal ﬁshermen. Another factor is that safety issues are not raised in employer–employee relations because most of the coastal vessel 
owners and ﬁshermen are members of the same union. In coastal ﬁshing ﬂeets, the owner(s) are often included in the crew, who, in turn, 
live in the same local community and can be members of the same family; furthermore, there has not been any critical key stakeholder 
advocating for worker safety. Another aspect is that the ﬁshermen’s attitude towards risk and safety in their work can be seen as fatalistic, 
especially in taking for granted the likelihood of accidents (Sutherland and Flin, 1989). 
There was a delay of 15–20 years from the development of enforced self-regulation in the Norwegian offshore petroleum industry to 
the emergence of the same principles within the maritime industries, including the ﬁsheries. However, the conditions for 
implementing the principles in ﬁsheries differ widely between deep sea industrial ﬁsheries and coastal ﬁsheries with smaller vessels. The 
survey from the ﬁshing industries (Lie et al., 2005) shows a lack of commitment among the coastal ﬁsheries to implementing the new 
principles of systematic safety management, assessing safety, making plans for preventive actions and using safety delegates as change 
agents. Active participation from the crew is not dominant in that part of the industry. 
In contrast to the oil industry, the high number of fatal accidents in ﬁsheries has neither given rise to a public debate about 
safety standards nor to a common effort among the main stakeholders to improve safety standards. Even the total pollution from the 
ﬁshing ﬂeet may be considerable, though the oil pollution from an individual vessel plays a minor role. Each incident may be of small 
magnitude, and the reporting systems may not expose such minor incidents to the public. Thus, pollution from ﬁsheries is an almost 
non-existent issue. For the market and consumers, quality and safe marine products count more than unsafe conditions for the 
ﬁshermen. 
5.3. Bulk carriers 
The industrial structure of maritime transport has undergone major changes regarding ownership, specialization and technology 
(Kristiansen, 2005). Keeping the ship seaworthy is a condition for ensuring the safety of cargo, passengers and crew, as is keeping oil 
from polluting the sea and shores. Consequently, there is a strong link between the cost/beneﬁt analysis of the ship and an 
assessment of the societal risk, including to the crew, local communities and society as a whole. As a global trade, the means of 
improvement within maritime transport have to be handled on a global level. Technical improvement and standard setting organized 
and developed by the IMO and made mandatory through the Flag state and classiﬁcation societies have improved safety and safety 
management systems in compliance with the ISM Code. The industrial relations and unions are weak and almost non-existent in the 
industry. As documented in the Leros Strength case, sea-farers and their relatives are most often isolated and unable to coordinate 
their claims. Often, the relatives do not know what happened with the cases of other relatives if they are in different countries or live in 
large countries, such as India and China (Bailey, 2006). In such cases the seafarers and their families depend upon a larger network 
of actors on a global level, such as the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the International Transport Workers Federation 
(ITF), with national and local branches. Mobilizing and challenging national authorities as ports of call, introducing embargos on ships 
or imposing a blockade can be effective means of intervention. 
The introduction of new regulations such as the ISM Code was a reaction to major accidents at sea and was also intended as a pro- 
active element in line with modern safety management principles within ‘the culture of self-regulation’ (Kristiansen, 2005, p. 467).  
However, when ship owners, managers or their technical employees are incompetent or unwilling to follow the rules and 
regulations, the ISM Code has little effect (Andersen, 2003). From a strict cost-beneﬁt perspective one could ask why they should 
follow rules when regular loss of life of the seafarers is not producing any change, absent public pressure, government regulation, and so 
forth. 
Following the Leros Strength case illustrates the issue. Almost ten years after the loss of the ship a Maltese bulk carrier, managed by 
the same company, Leros Ship Management, was detained by the US Coast Guard in California. Among other deﬁciencies, it was 
found that the ship had cracks in its hull up to 2.5 feet long. A court in San Francisco ordered the owner of the ship to pay a US 
$50,000 criminal ﬁne and also US $100,000 in restitution that would help fund environmental restoration projects in the San 
Francisco Bay area, even though no pollution had resulted from the incident (http://users.skynet.be/p.woinin/sclerstr htm). 
6. Conclusion
The assessment of the three cases has given a better under- standing of why different industries react differently to pressure from
external regulators. The three industries represent quite different types of enterprises regarding capacities and culture for working 
with legal issues and cooperating with external regulators. The petroleum industry is dominated by a limited number of big enterprises 
with ‘machine bureaucratic structures’ (Mintzberg, 1979) well suited for cooperation with legal authorities and their rules and 
regulations. This structure also makes it easy for regulators to identify key partners within the industry concerning safety issues. The 
coastal ﬁshing industry has the opposite character: large numbers of small ﬁshing boats with a low degree of formal organization, high 
degree of personal freedom and a tradition to engage in risky activities. Maritime transport has some elements of self-regulation whereby 
the industry has made its own risk assessments through classiﬁcation societies. Regulatory authorities have difﬁculties in exercising 
control and implementing measures to improve safety due to the international organisation of the maritime sector. As demonstrated by 
the Leros Strength case, the result can be a laissez-faire system. 
The lessons learned from the three case studies can be summarized as follows: 
Firstly, structural characteristics of both the industries and the regulatory regime to a large extent determine the interactions between 
the regulated and the regulator. 
Secondly, enforced regulations and a capacity for regulators to implement sanctions, and the presence of well-organized and competent 
industries as counterparts to the regulators, make a substantial contribution to the reduction of incidents and accidents. 
Thirdly, the three industries have introduced similar principles of enforced self-regulation with delegation of safety management 
systems to the enterprises. However, new legal principles of risk regulation and safety management have a very limited effect on 
safety if they are not accepted as legitimate by industrial actors. Such principles may remain an empty shell of bureaucratic procedures 
unless they are implemented by motivated and competent actors and followed by clear industrial standards. 
Fourthly, unions can play a crucial role in the implementation of regulations both as ‘watch dogs’ and as competent partners, as seen 
in the Norwegian petroleum industry. 
Finally, some industrial sectors remain without power or incentives to exploit information about their hazards. In sectors where 
hazards and risks are visible and of public interest, it is easier to implement regulations through outside pressure from regulators and 
other stakeholders such as internationally organised unions. 
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